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1Abstract
Signiﬁcant ambiguity surrounds the magnitude and sign of the effect of foreign
aid on economic economic growth. Foreign aid can potentialy augment scarce
domestic capital to spur growth but foreign aid can also remove positive incentive
to build wealth, stalling growth. This paper characterizes the effect of foreign
aid on the growth of Sub-Saharan African countries after correcting endogeneity
problems that plague the estimation. Foriegn aid is found to be growth promoting
given good governance and using ﬁxed effects in a static panel framework. Data
from twenty-one Sub-Saharan African countries spanning 1995-2003 was used
in the estimation. The ﬁnding of a signiﬁcant foreign aid-growth relationship is
pertinent because it suggests that increased aid to Sub Saharan Africa is one way
to achieve the UN’s Millennium goals. By lobbying for increased foreign aid,
advocates are prescribing a necessary albeit insufﬁcient medicine for Sub Saharan
Africa’s economic problems.
21 Introduction
In spite of criticisms by prominent economists, notably: Friedman (1958), Easterly
(2006); Easterly (2003) and Collier (2007) regarding the effectiveness of foreign aid
in stimulating growth, the developed world continues to commit substantial ﬁnancial
assistance to countries in Sub-Saharan Africa or SSA in an effort to stimulate growth
((Ali and Isse, 2004) and (Goumanee, Mourissey, and Girma, 2005). Easterly (2006)
contends that existing aid organizations have achieved very little poverty reduction
despite the astronomical sums of money they have spent on SSA and questions why
such little growth has been achieved with so much aid. 1 Should OECD countries
continue to pump aid to LDC countries? Is aid money to SSA justiﬁed? A major
contribution of this research is to provide answers to questions raised. 2
Aside from the political appeal that aid-giving represents for incumbent rich coun-
try governments, the OECD resolve to ramp up aid is hardly surprising because it is
in line with the effort to achieve the United Nation’s Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs) 3. The basic aim of the MDGs is to reduce the level of poverty in the world
1See for example (Mukherjee, Shukralla, and Kedir, 2008) and Easterly, 2006 for an expansion of the
argument.
2We acknowledge that aid plummetted recently after steep increases in aid to Iraq and Nigeria in 2005.
Total ofﬁcial development assistance (ODA) from members of the Development Assistance Committee
(DAC) fell by 8.4 percent in real terms in 2007 to USD 103.7 billion. This represents a drop from 0.31
percent of members combined gross national income in 2006 to 0.28 percent in 2007: source: OECD DAC
Statistics.
3The eight millenium development goals are: (1) Eradicate hunger and poverty (2) Achieve universal
primary education (3) Promote gender equality and empower women (4) Reduce child mortality (5) Improve
maternal health (6) Combat HIV/AIDA and malarial diseases (7) Ensure environmental sustainability and
3to half the level it was in 2000 by 2015 (UN, 2000). The MDGs require countries
to institue certain good macroeconomic policies reccomended in the work of Burn-
side and Dollar (2000). 4 The MDGs therefore inherently assume that aid is growth
promoting. However if the necessary condition that ensures aid is growth-promoting
is not ”‘good policy”’ as the work of Burnside and Dollar (2000) dictates but aid is
given only to good policy countries then the MDGs may likely not succeed. Given
this important point, it makes sense to re-visit the empirical question of just how much
foreign aid can be expected to help the growth effort in SSA.5 Will the related expecta-
tions that donors have of aid such as promoting peace ever be realized? Or is the wrong
medicine being used to ﬁx this important problem? Is foreign aid to SSA more likely
to act as a catalyst to domestic production, boosting exports and growth (Burton, 1969)
or are SSA countries doomed to aid-dependence?(Arellano, Bulir, Lane, and Lipschitz,
2005). 6 It is likely that the answer to these questions lie more in the empirical realm
than in theoretical foundations. Unfortunately the theoretical underpinnings of the aid-
growth relationship are inadequate at best and most economists have had to rely on
(8) Develop a global partnership for development
4For example, countries were supposed to pursue policies that will guarante a budget surplus, low inﬂa-
tion rate, and trade openness. It was assumed such countries will neccessarily use aid to grow.
5Aid is formally deﬁned as Ofﬁcial Development Assistance (ODA). In practice, there are two main
types of aid: Bilateral and multilateral aid. Bilateral aid is given by the government of one country to another
directlythroughanaidagency. Multilateralaidisgiventoaparticularcountrythroughinternationalagencies.
6Since aid is also given for sinister motives such as for strategic military purposes, the effect of aid on
growth in Africa may be also be conditioned on other factors such as: whether the African country is a
strategic millitaty ally, was a French colony, an English colony, a Portuguese, colony, an Islamic country, or
has resident whites. Although we use ODA in this research, we are careful to ﬁlter out these effects in the
methodology following the procedure used by (Islam, 2005).
4empirical correlations with little relevance to theory. Furthermore there remain differ-
ent endogeneity problems regarding the estimation of the aid-growth relation that are
yet unexplored. This is because even though aid may boost growth it might be the very
presence of low growth that attracts more aid, so we have manifested here one kind of
endogeneity problem (Radelet, Clemens, and Bhavnani, 2005). 7
It may also be the case that aid promotes growth and it is the countries that use aid
successfully to grow that gets more aid. An alternative yet plausible view is that aid
and growth are determined simultaneously so that countries that recieve more aid grow
fastest (or slowest) and countries that grow fastest (or slowest) recieve more aid. This
paper takes this later view. Furthermore, if country speciﬁc effects are present in the
growth equation we potentially have another kind of endogeneity problem (Maddalla
1971 and Islam 1995). Finally it is plausible that the aid data is measured with error
which can introduce ﬁnite sample bias into OLS estimates. Fortunately, the increasing
availability of time series data and more sophisticated econometric methods to handle
model misspeciﬁcation problems means we can now address these variant endogeneity
problems. For this reason, the question of the effect of aid on growth remains relevant.
The resolution of the aid-growth puzzle makes even more sense in SSA Africa which
has received the most aid but is still the world’s poorest region. 8 It will certainly prove
educative if the exact conditions under which foreign aid stimulates growth in SSA are
identiﬁed and included in policy decisions9
7This might explain the persistently negative relationship between aid and growth often found in the
literature
8According to the UN Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) received nearly 600 billion dollars in aid from 1960-
2007.
9For clarity and in order to avoid clutter all tables in this report are included at the end of the report.
5Traditionalanalysisoftheimpactofaidongrowthcanbedepressingasithighlights
the transfer problem 10 and the possible negative Dutch Disease effects 11.
Although there also exist some more positive views about the efﬁcacy of aid in
promoting growth what is the actual relation between aid and growth in Africa?. Is the
effect of aid on growth region-speciﬁc?, period-speciﬁc?, negative? positive? insignif-
icant, conditional on speciﬁc variables or ambiguous? This paper is a contribution to
the literature that is trying to understand the effect of aid on growth. Apart from us-
ing the most recent data and including new dummy variables (eg for oil producing and
diamond producing countries) to control for group effects, and limiting my focus to
SSA, the main contribution this paper makes is to address some of the different kinds
of endogeneity problems that plague the aid-growth relation. These relevant endogene-
ity problems include: endogeneity due to individual speciﬁc effects 12 endogeneity due
to simultaneity bias (aid, growth, political stability, and policies may be determined
together), endogeneity due to measurement error which can lead to attenuation bias,
endogeneity due to omitted variable bias, and endogeneity due to feedback effects (for
10The transfer problem: The problem of how an international transfer is executed through adjustment of
the external trade balance (Arellano et al, 2005). Economics theory claims achieving the transfer involves a
combination of higher imports, lower exports and foreign currency depreciations none of which is a particu-
larly strong reason to advocate for more aid to developing countries
11Dutch Diseas in the context of aid dictates that a large in-transfer of aid to a poor country ultimately
leads to a decrease in exports. Aid increases the supply of tradable goods and dampens their price. By the
income effect it increases the demand for non-tradables. Scarce resources are then diverted from the export
sector to the tradable sector (Arellano et al 2005)
12The key issue is whether the unobserved country speciﬁc effect is correlated with the matrix of explana-
tory variables. If it is, OLS is biased and inconsistent Wooldridge (2001) also Greene (2000); Anderson and
Hsiao (1981) and Bond (2002).
6example when growth is deﬁned as persistent and Yt 1 is added to the right hand side
of the growth equation).
To account for simultaneity bias, following Islam (2005), we deﬁne a 4-equation
simultaneous system involving policy, political stability (or good governance), aid and
growth since these variables are often determined together. We employ instrumental
variable techniques to solve the simultaneous system. The SSA region is characterized
by signiﬁcant heterogeneity between the countries because of their history of coloniza-
tion by different European powers 13 We argue that there might be unobserved country
speciﬁc effects present in any growth equation using a sample of SSA countries. Cor-
relation between these unobserved country speciﬁc effects and the error term usually
renders pooled OLS inconsistent ((Islam 1995); (G.S.Madalla, 1971) and (Mundlak,
1978). We therefore appeal to different speciﬁcation tests to isolate the correct model
that accounts for this endogeneity. We conﬁrm that the main causes of endogeneity
bias are country-speciﬁc effects and ﬁnd that the ﬁxed effects panel estimator yields
consistent results.
For completeness, we also analyze possible dynamic effects in the aid-growth re-
lation. Speciﬁcally we include lagged growth as an explanatory variable, thus intro-
ducing ommited variable bias. We are less successful with this exercise and fail to
pin down economically signiﬁcant dynamic effects involving aid and growth. In order
words, the aid variable ceases to be signiﬁcant in the dynamic panel formulation of the
13Speciﬁcally because each country on average has more than a few tribes, languages, and to some extent
economic systems they are different. Obviously there are similarities between some of the countries for
example the block of Francophone countries but in general these countries are very dissimilar.
7aid-growth system of equations.14 Section 1 reviews the current literature regarding
the aid-growth relationship. Section 2 describes the empirical model used, provides a
brief description of static panel as well as dynamic panel data models, and describes
the variables used. Section 3 summarizes and describes the data. Section 4 presents
and discusses the results. Section 5 concludes and provides suggestions for further
research.
2 Literature Review
It is rather ironic that the economic literature is yet to reach a consensus about the effect
of aid on growth given the substantial work that has already been completed in the ﬁeld
Roodman (2004). At a minimum, the fact that a good number of the poor countries that
have received the bulk of aid in history remain poor questions the effectiveness of aid
as a poverty-alleviating tool (Ali and Isse 2005); (Sachs, 2005); Collier 2007). William
Easterly putsthe aid dilemmain perspective ”Afterﬁfty years andmore than 2.3trillion
dollars in aid from the West to alleviate poverty in the Rest, there is shockingly little to
show for it” (Easterly 2006).
Why is the aid-growth relationship so difﬁcult to pin down? There are valid theo-
retical arguments why the aid coefﬁcient in a growth regression is ambiguous in sign.
14The key issue is whether the unobserved country speciﬁc effect is correlated with the matrix of explana-
tory variables. If it is, OLS is biased and inconsistent Wooldridge (2003) also (Greene, 2000), (Anderson
and Hsiao, 1981); (Bond, 2002). One explanation why the dynamic panel model does not identify the aid-
variable as a signiﬁcant explanatory variable may be that all other independent variables (including aid) do
not have much to explain, once the lagged dependent variable (in this case lagged growth) is accounted for.
8In the forward direction, according to the ”gap theory” 15 argument due to Chenery and
Strout (1966), aid can promote growth because it often augments the foreign exchange
needed in production for aid-dependent ventures (Chenery 1966; Islam 2005 and East-
erly 2003). A valid counter argument to the effectiveness of aid is that countries that
receive aid just use aid in consumption, effectively becoming aid dependent (Radelet
et al 2005 and Ali and Isse 2005). These countries neither put the aid dollars into pro-
ductive use nor invest it because of the fungibility of aid Gomannee (2005) and the
ease with which it can be consumed (Burnside and Dollar 2000); (Hansen and Tarp,
2002) ; (Hansen, Dalgard, and Tarp, 2004). In fact Arrelano et al (2005) argue that a
permanent ﬂow of aid most likely ends up in consumption (Arrellano et al, 2005).
Of course there are also those economists that argue that aid actually retards growth
or at best has an insigniﬁcant effect (Boon, 1996); (Cassen, 1994) also (Grifﬁn and
McKinley, 1994). Yet others believe that the relationship is non-linear.
The empirical evidence regarding the effect of aid on growth is just as confounding.
Hansen and Tarp (2002) ﬁnd that the aid-growth effect is sensitive to choice of estima-
tor. Hansen and Dalgaard (2001) ﬁnd that aid promotes growth irrespective of policy
environment. Ghura, Hadjimichael, Mhleisen, and Nord (1995) and Lensik and White
(2000) ﬁnd positive but decreasing marginal returns to aid by introducing the square
of the aid variable. Gomanee (2005) ﬁnds a positive aid-growth effect using only SSA
data but to a large extent he concentrates his research on transmission mechanisms by
15The Chenery and Strout (1966) two-gap theory used to justify allocations of aid literally comprises of
2 gaps. The ﬁrst gap consists of the amount of aid needed to achieve a target growth and domestic saving.
The second gap consists of import requirement for a given level of production and foreign exchange Easterly
(2003).
9which aid affects growth and sidesteps to an extent some of the issues of endogeneity
that emanates from the aid-growth speciﬁcation.
In their seminal paper, Burnside and Dollar (2000) conclude that the aid-growth
effect is positive for good policy countries but negative for countries with bad policies
16 Lensink and White (2000) also observe that policies are more growth promoting
when supported by aid ﬂows. There is also signiﬁcant evidence in the literature that
aid has a negative effect on growth or at best an insigniﬁcant effect. Boone (1996)
and Mckinley (1994). Other writers ﬁnd that if certain variables, for example policy
is controlled for, aid has a signiﬁcant effect (Easterly 2003 and Burnside and Dollar
2000).
Islam (2005) concludes that a stable political environment is a necessary condition
for aid to promote growth. Burnside and Dollar (2000) had argued that the necessary
condition was policy. Islam counters by arguing that the necessary condition for aid to
be growth promoting is political stability. Islam (2005) and Easterly (2003) concur that
the positive aid-growth relationship found by Burnside and Dollar (2000) was the result
of the misinterpretation of the signiﬁcant interaction term between aid and policy.
In direct contrast, other economists ﬁnd aid has no effect even when we control for
the so-called important variables. Goumanee et al (2005) argue that the consistently
negative dummy found for SSA is evidence there is something ”different” about SSA
and limit their study to 25 SSA countries over a 25-year period. They ﬁnd that aid
actually supports growth but the contribution of aid is indirect. Aid promotes growth
16Eskander Mukherjee, Debasri Shukralla and Elias Kedir, 2008 ﬁnd basically the same result with some
qualiﬁcations.
10in SSA through its contribution to investment. Goumanee et al do not however adress
the kinds of endogeneity problems that is the focus of this paper leaving thier conclu-
sions in doubt. Islam (2005) ﬁnds that when the data is limited to stable countries, aid
supports growth. In short, the controversy about the effect of aid on growth rages on.
This paper is a response to some of the questions generated from reviewing the
aid literature. Following Goumanee (2005) the sample is limited to countries in the
SSA region but in conformity with Islam (2005), possible endogeneity in the growth
equation is controlled for by instrumenting the endogenous variables in the 4-equation
simultaneous system although ultimately panel methods are used in contrast to pooled
2SLS that Islam emphasized. Islam’s work, though innovative because it under-lined
the importance of political instability has a few shortcomings. First and foremost,
although he recognizes the possible non-linearity of the aid GDP relation and possible
endogeneity problems he does not appeal to sufﬁcient speciﬁcation testing to enable
him isolate the best possible estimator to generate his estimates. Furthermore, his
decision to use pooled OLS as the preferred estimator is debatable. Almost invariably
there will be endogeneity bias caused by country speciﬁc effects but unfortunately he
used the FE estimator (which is an appropriate estimator to use) but does not provide
sufﬁcient explanation of this choice. This research focuses on the aid growth relation
with exclusive regards to the SSA region for reasons already explained.
A sample of 21 countries for which data was available for all the pertinent variables
was used. 17 By using the most recent data, including more relevant variables, and
17To replace missing values with appropriate substitutes, I employed the Multiple Imputation by Chained
Equations (MICE) technique. I implemented the MICE procedure in STATA using the STATA command
”ice”. MICE techniques have been found to be superior to nave methods of controlling for missing values
11addressing some of the endogeneity problems that plague the aid growth relationship,
a more robust estimate of the returns to aid in SSA is realized.
3 The Empirical Model
The dynamic panel model used in this paper is due to Islam (1995). Islam adapted
(Mankiw, Romer, and Weil, 1992)’s formulation of the textbook Solow Model to ac-
count for time-invariant country speciﬁc effects associated with the initial endowment.
A general speciﬁcation of Islam’s dynamic panel model is shown in (1)
Yit = Xit + s
X
s=1
Xs;it + i + it + 
 (1)
Where Yit 1 is the lagged dependent variable, t is the period speciﬁc effects,i
are the country speciﬁc effects and the it are idiosyncratic error (mean 0 and variance
2). 
 is the over all constant and accounts for seasonal and cyclical effects.18
The vector Xit includes traditional determinants of growth (See Chart 1) and the
following endogenous variables: Ait =Aid/GDP, PI = Political stability Index (a P*1
vector of variables; PS is the same as good governance in this paper) and POL = Policy
Index (Burnside and Dollar, 2000). Furthermore, (Ait/GDPit,)2, is also included to
accountforpossiblenon-linearity. Someinteractionvariableswerealsoincludedwhich
I will discuss further in the procedure section. Before proceeding further we clarify
such as replacing missing values with averages of existing values Van Buren et all (1999)
18Suppose  = 1 then we have a unit root, which will undermine the results of this research. Given the
short panel we could not apply the ADF test for unit root so we assume away this potentially damaging
possibility and proceed with the assumption that growth does not follow a random walk.
12that the research is divided into 2 distinct parts. In part 1, we do not include the lagged
dependent variable as one of the explanatory variables. In order words we assume that
there are no dynamics or feedback effects in the growth equation so part 1 only deals
with static panel data models. In part 2, we relax this assumption and employ dynamic
panel data methods in the spirit of Anderson and Hsiao (1981); Blundell and Bond
(1998); (Arrelano and Bond, 1996) and Bond (2002). Recall that as previously stated,
in part 1, we side-step the feedback issue and focus on the simultaneity bias problem
so in pragmatic terms we are only dealing with a one shot, 4-eqn simultaneous system.
We now proceed to discus the ﬁrst stage equation for each of the three endogenous
variables AID, Policy (POL) and Political Stability (PS) in the 4-equation simultaneous
system of GDP growth.
3.1 The Aid Equation
Ait = 0 + kKit + !it (2)
Where Kit (which is the vector of instruments for aid) includes Initial GDP, Infant
Mortality rate, log population, lagged policy index, and the lagged aid variables 19 As
I have argued, aid may be endogenous in the growth equation so it is necessary to
instrument aid with relevant instruments. Donor countries usually give aid for reasons
linked to their own self-interest. Boone (1996) and Islam (2005) document that the
allocation of aid depends on:
 Political links between donor and recipient countries
 Socio-economic climate




list to capture strategic interests 20 Following Islam, the logarithm of population is
included as a proxy of structural exposure to trade shocks. Finally the Lagged value of
aid is also included in the instrument list. The results of the Aid equation is presented
in column 3 of Table 3





Where Zit is a vector of instruments. The instruments and the proxies used to measure
them are Education: Primary school enrolment as a percentage of GDP; Democracy:
Dummy = 1 if democratic Good economic Performance: Positive growth rate of GDP;
Diamonds/Oil: Dummy = 1 if present respectively. Political stability or good gover-
nance has been found to be a necessary condition for aid to be growth promoting at
least for LDCs (Islam 2005). We therefore extend this argument to the sample of SSA
countries. We use the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of Transparency International
to proxy for political stability.21 The argument is made that that there is a strong corre-
lation between corruption and political instability. The CPI ranges from 0-10 with 10
20These countries receive the bulk of French Aid to Africa.
21See Appendix for the attached methodology for the generation of this variable. Also found at trans-
parency.com. We also repeated the estimations in this paper using different mesures of poltical stability but
the results did not change much
14being the most stable countries. To ensure that the political stability is not endogenous
in the growth equation, it is instrumented with appropriate variables. Several factors
affect political stability (or by implication, political instability in a country). Average
level of education, system or type of government (democracy or dictatorship), good
economic performance, whether the country has diamonds or oil may also be a sig-
niﬁcant factor. A high level of education is expected to be positively correlated with
political stability (Barro, 1996), democracies are more stable on average than other
types of government and should also be positively correlated with political stability.
On average good economic performance is expected to be positively correlated with
political stability while having diamonds or oil will be negatively correlated with po-
litical stability 22
Table 4, columns 2 and 3 reports the estimates from the political stability equation.
Column 2 reports the weights that were used in creating the PS index. Column 3 is a
report of the 1st stage instrumental variable regression involving the PS index and its
instruments
3.3 The Policy Equation
POLit = 0 + GGit + NP OL
i t (4)
Borrowing from Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Islam (2005) the policy variable
used in this paper is constructed as a linear combination of three main indicators of
22Other relevant variables include Party fractionalization index (PFI), which captures the degree of dishar-
mony among members of the legislature. Ethno-linguistic fractionalization index is also included to capture
the effect of homogeneity of a society on political instability.
15macro policy: Trade openness 23, Budget surplus (deﬁned as government revenue-
expenditures) and inﬂation. Weights in the index depend on relative inﬂuence on
growth 24. To mitigate endogeneity bias of policy in the growth equation, the policy in-
dex in this paper is instrumented by: Initial Level of Human capital (EDU), initial value
of GDP per capita (Y0), lagged value of policy index (PIt1) and lagged Aid (AIDt1)
(See Table 4, Column2). The effect of policy on growth has enjoyed signiﬁcant analy-
sis in the literature with Easterly (2003), Hansen and Tarp (2001), Burnside and Dollar
(2001) and Arrellano et al (2005) having all contributed. Evidence has been mixed. 25
3.4 Identiﬁcation
Both the rank and order conditions for the simultaneous system are achieved because
the system contains several exogenous variables and only 4 endogenous variables. As
has been extensively described, the endogenous variables are instrumented to minimize
endogeneity bias before being included in the growth equation (1)
23As Harrison (1996) explains there are numerous measures of trade openness but the two main kinds of
trade openness measure openness by means of trade volume and restrictions to trade. The typical volume
measure is the value of trade share = (export-imports)/GDP. I use export/GDP. The black market premium
is also sometimes used The black market premium gauges the severity of trade restriction as a reﬂection of
how successful the price rationing mechanism is in the foreign exchange market. The black market premium
is typically growth retarding so it is negatively correlated to growth. I used the balck premium in some of
my regression trials but results aere not different.
24To determine weights in the POL index, the independent variables in the policy index are regressed on
GDP per capita growth by pooled OLS. The coefﬁcients are used as the weights to construct the policy index
25Among the prominent economists who build indices of openness are Leammer (1998), Dollar (1992)
and Sachs and Warriner (1998).
164 A Primer on Panel Data Models
Since panel data estimators were used extensively in this work, we pause to discuss
brieﬂy their relevance. Different econometric procedures exist for estimating static and
dynamic panel data models but we focus ﬁrst on the static panel data models: pooled
least square (PLS), random effects (ER) and ﬁxed effects (FE)
4.1 Pooled LS (PLS)
Consider the pooled LS model below
Yit = Xit + s
X
s=1
Xs;it + i + it + 
 (5)
Where 
 is an over-all constant and it is assumed to be an iid random error. Pooled
LS ignores country speciﬁc characteristics. Note that in this speciﬁcation t is the time
index and i is the country index. Furthermore s indexes the explanatory variables.
4.2 Random Effect(RE)
Yit = Xit + s
X
s=1
Xs;it + i + i + it + 
 (6)
Where i is the random disturbance characterizing the i-th country. Other variables
retain original deﬁnitions. RE does not ignore the country speciﬁc effect but assumes
that the correlation between the unobserved country speciﬁc effect and the RHS matrix
of explanatory variables is zero 26
26RE assumes all heterogeneity is observed.
174.3 Fixed Effect(FE)
Yit = Xit + s
X
s=1
Xs;it + i + t + it + 
 (7)
Here t represents the set of time dummies; one for each time period and i is the
country speciﬁc effect all other variables retain earlier deﬁnitions from the PLS equa-
tion. LSDV ignores neither the country speciﬁc nor does it assume that it is unobserv-
able. Rather, LSDV tries to control for the country speciﬁc effect by using dummy
variables. However, LSDV does assume E (Xits, it) = 0. If E (Xits, it) is really
zero so that there is no feedback from past values of the dependent variable to affect the
present level of the dependent variable then LSDV or the within estimator is unbiased
and efﬁcient. However, ex ante it is not clear whether a high level of growth today is
not affected by yesterday’s growth, as there is contrasting evidence in the literature.
We make a simplifying assumption as does Islam that these variables are determined
together and specify a 4-equation simultaneous system and estimate by ﬁxed effects.
Inpart2whereweaddYt 1totheRHSofthegrowthequation;wecannolongerguaranteethatE(Xits,
it) = 0. When Yt 1 belongs to the matrix of explanatory variables it is, it is unlikely E
(Xits, it) will be zero so OLS is biased and inconsistent (Anderson and Hsiao 1981
and (Bond, 2002). In fact, adding the lagged dependent variable to the RHS of the
regression can produce additional endogeneity bias quite distinct from the endogeneity
caused by country speciﬁc effects (Yasar, Nelson, and Rejesus, 2007) and Bond 2002).
This is because although ﬁrst differencing can be used to easily eliminate the country
speciﬁc effect, the country speciﬁc effect is eliminated at the cost of creating a new
error term (it - it 1) that is correlated with the lagged dependent variable (Yassar,
Nelson and Rejesus, 2007). Clearly we need instrumental variables to get consistent
18estimates. Under the assumption that there is no autocorrelation in the error term,
Anderson and Hsiao use the second lagged level, Yit 2, or second lagged difference,
dYit 2(since it is not correlated with the ﬁrst differenced error (it - it 1), as an
instrument to correct for the existing correlation. In order words, First differencing and
the within transformation both eliminate the individual speciﬁc effect but in addition
create an unwanted and signiﬁcant correlation between the ﬁrst differenced error and
the country speciﬁc term (Bond 2002). Because of this correlation, ﬁxed effects (FE)
and ﬁrst differencing (FD) are no longer the consistent estimators since the IV estima-
tor is asymptotically superior to FE and FD in this case. In the dynamic panel data
context, we use the GMM estimator, which is equivalent to 2SLS. 27 But what are the
appropriate instruments to use? We have already mentioned one form of instrument
that was used by Anderson and Hsiao (1981).
Recall that to deﬁne acceptable moments we need corresponding and valid orthog-
onality or moment conditions. Further in picking the right instruments we should not
lose sight of the need for strong instruments. The Anderson and Hsiao estimator suf-
fers from the weak instrument problem because it does not make use of all the moment
conditions available to obtain the maximum number of instruments (Bond 2002). Ar-
rellano and Bond (1991) introduced the one-step GMM estimator28 which, improved
on the Anderson ﬁrst differenced GMM estimator by deﬁning more moment conditions
27The seminal paper that analyzed feedback effects in the growth equation is due to (Islam, 1995) although
he was primarily concerned with convergence. We draw on Islam analysis for the interpretation of the
coefﬁcients.
28There is also a two-step version of the estimator. The 1-step and 2-step estimator differ only in the
var-covariance matrix.
19and enabling the use of more instruments. Blundel and Bond (1998) subsequently im-
proved on the Arrelano and Bond estimator by deﬁning the system GMM dynamic
panel estimator, which used all possible instruments and by implication all possible
moments. The system GMM dynamic panel estimator uses the levels of the dependent
variables (lagged 2 periods) as instruments in the 1st difference equation and used the
differenced dependent variable (2 periods) as instruments in the level equation. By
using the maximum number of instruments, the system GMM dynamic estimator is
potentially the most efﬁcient of all the dynamic panel estimators.
5 Procedure
5.1 Procedure For Part 1
Following Barro (1996), Islam (1995) and Renelt (1992), we apply the general speciﬁ-
cation of a growth model (1) that derives from neoclassical growth theory to a sample
of Sub-Sarahan African countries. Islam (1995) rigorously derives the dynamic panel
analog of the growth model from a textbook Solow model. Such a panel growth spec-
iﬁcation is employed to allow for the possibility of individual speciﬁc effects in the
growth equation. To address simultaneity bias, we instrument the aid equation , the
policy equation and the political stability equation29 (all displayed earlier) and calcu-
late predicted values from each equation. We then include the predicted values of these
endogenous variables in the growth equation (1) so as to minimize endogeneity bias.
In order to fully account for endogeneity, the best method to estimate (1) was iso-
29Islam deﬁned this variable as Political Instability which is the inverse of my variable (Political Stability
20latedbyusingdifferentspeciﬁcationtestsinastep-wisemanner 30. SinceIslamignored
country-speciﬁc effects by using 2SLS on pooled time series-cross-section data for his
model, we test whether the possible presence of country speciﬁc effect is causing en-
dogeneity in the growth equation. Speciﬁcally we test for endogeneity due to country
speciﬁc effects using two asymptotically equivalent methods. The ﬁrst test is due to
Hausman (1986) and an equivalent reproduced in Woolridge (2003). The latter test
requires the addition of country means to the rest of the variables in the equation and
estimating by ﬁxed effects. The results of the Wooldride test of endogeneity are re-
ported in Table 1. Unfortunately the Hausman test was not successful, as my data did
not meet the asymptotic requirement of the Hausman test 31As described already, the
Wooldridge test was used to decide between the consistent estimator (FE) and the GLS
estimator (RE). We cannot reject the presence of individual speciﬁc effect so we con-
30Although not reported, we did test and reject strict exogeneity following the procedure outlined in
Wooldridge (2003). The test involves including the leads of the explanatory variables as additional ex-
ogenous variables and estimating by ﬁxed effects. A rejection of the null hypothesis that the coefﬁcients of
the leads are all zero establishes strict exogeneity. If strict exogeneity holds and the variance of the error
term is constant, then pooled LS (PLS) is the BLUE estimator (Green 2000). However, the probability that
PLS will ever be chosen as the preferred estimator is very low. This is because the error variance will have
to be a scalar for that to happen and this almost never occurs. If strict exogeneity holds but the error term
is heteroskedastic, then RE is preferred to PLS (Bond 2002). In the event that strict exogeneity is violated
and country speciﬁc effects present endogeneity problems, First differencing (FD) is the optimal estimator.
FD is preferred to FE when strict exogeneity fails because the within transformation causes speciﬁcations
problems more frequently than the FD estimator (Wooldridge 2003). In this research the First difference
estimator and the within transformation produced near identical estmates
31This is not too problematic, as there has been some criticism of the Hausman test procedure among the
STATA community of users. The Wooldridge test is at the moment the preferred test of endogeneity.
21clude that ﬁxed is the appropriate estimator (see Table 2) We also test for and reject the
presence of serially correlated errors in the growth equation (see Table 3, Column 2).
To test for AR (1) serial correlation we added a lagged value of the residual from the
growth equation and estimated by pooled OLS. Non-signiﬁcance of the lagged residual
conﬁrms no serial correlation. To further explore the aid growth regression, the square
of the aid variable was included in the regression and (1) was estimated by ﬁxed effects.
The aid-policy interaction was also subsequently included and (1) was re-estimated by
ﬁxed effect. The results are presented Table 3, column 4. Due to multicollinearity
problems and because we had a rather limited sample size I did not include both the
aid interaction and the square of the aid variable at the same time.32
5.2 Procedure For Part 2
We now include the lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable in the growth
equation and execute the ﬁrst difference estimator due to Anderson and Hsiao (1981).
We also operationalize the Arrellano and Bover (1995) and Bludel and Bond (1998)
dynamic panel estimators using the STATA code used in Bond (2002). Table 4 com-
pares these dynamic panel model estimates. Tables 4 also reports the Sargan test of
over-riding restrictions as well as the Arrelano and Bond test of AR(1) and AR(2) se-
rial correlation.
32We also performed a regression where we replaced the aid-policy interaction with the aid-good gover-
nance (or political stability) intraction and got a signiﬁcant result: Conditional on political stability aid was
signiﬁcant
226 Data Description
The bulk of the data used in the study came from the World Development Indicators of
theWorldBank, thePennWorldTables(AlanHestonandAten,2003), FAO,ThePolity
Index of political Measures, Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index
(CPI) and the University of Illinois (UIUC)’s GMID index. As a result of difﬁculty
locating data for some countries for all the variables in the model, only the following
21 SSA countries (see List 1 below) were included in the study.
LIST 1: Angola Benin Burkina-Faso Cameroon Cape-Verde CIV Congo-Dem-
Republic Gabon Gambia Ghana Namibia Niger Nigeria Rwanda Senegal South-Africa
Togo Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe.
The countries that were excluded from the list either had too few observations per
year or had observations for years that were too far apart to be useful. The data used
covered the period 1995 to 2003. We use 1-year growth rates for the sake of data
availability although Islam N (1995) and Islam M (2005) both suggest that one-year
intervals might be too short to capture growth rates. We use one-year growth rates on
the assumption that this is long enough time for aid effect to manifest in growth, as it
is an absolute necessity in SSA. In a later paper we will also divide the data set into 5-
year subs-samples. The argument by Islam (1995) in support of using 5 year averages
is straightforward: ”not only do convergence effects disappear in short panels but also
cyclical inﬂuences are less pronounced”. In a 5-year averages sample, the errors are
separated by 5 calendar years and are less likely to be correlated. Note that for the sake
of organizational clarity, all tables referred to in this paper are included at the end of
the report. Chart 1 outlines the main variables used in the analysis. Note that multi-
23colinearity problems forced the omission of several of the interaction variables. We did
however include the AID*POL interaction.
7 Results
From Table 2, it is obvious that we cannot ignore the possibility of the presence of
country speciﬁc effects. Applying the test of endogeneity reiterated in Wooldridge
(2003), we reject the null hypothesis that the means of the independent variables are
jointly zero. This means FE is preferred to RE and Pooled OLS. Pooled LS or RE
effects will yield inconsistent results therefore ﬁxed effects is the appropriate estima-
tor. Table 3, column 2 points to the fact that serial correlation is not a problem in this
model because the coefﬁcient on the lagged residual is insigniﬁcant. Tables 4 contain
the results of ﬁrst stage regression from attempts to minimize endogeneity bias by in-
strumenting the endogenous variables but since my focus is the growth equation I do
not well on these results. Paradoxically we ﬁnd that we cannot conﬁrm Burnside and
Dollar (2000) result of a positive aid-Growth interaction for our subset of SSA coun-
tries. This is most clearly seen by comparing Table 3, columns 5 and Table 3 column
4. While the aid-policy interaction is insigniﬁcant in column 5, the political stability
coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant at 1 percent in column 4 when we exclude the policy-aid in-
teraction. Our result however agrees with Islam (2005) who concluded that political
stability was necessary for aid to promote growth but policy is not. We therefore select
the model displayed by Table 3, columns 5 as the right model 33. We acknowledge that
33When we replace the aid policy interaction with the aid political stability interaction we get signiﬁcant
results. We do not introduce both interaction effects to minimize multicollinearity problems
24there are still some problems with this model. For example the sign of the government
consumption ratio is positive but we expect it to be negative, thankfully this variable is
not signiﬁcant. On the positive side, the model in Table 3, columns 5 has a lot of good
econometric properties and conforms to most of the theoretical predictions. First of
all, we are able to conﬁrm convergence because the sign of the initial GDP variable is
negative. This is consistent with theoretical prediction. According to the standard neo-
classical theory of growth, countries that start of with low endowments grow faster than
resource rich countries Islam (1996), Romer (1996). Barro and Sala-i Martin (1996)
conﬁrm convergence for OECD countries so we are not surprised by congergence in
this sample of SSA countries. The openness variable is positive and signiﬁcant. Harri-
son (1996) argues that more open countries grow faster. The political stability or good
govenance variable is also positive and signiﬁcant as expected and as found by Islam
(2005). The democracy variable is positive and signiﬁcant as can be expected because
more democratic or ”free” countries usually grow faster Barro (1996). But perhaps
the most signiﬁcant result is the ﬁnding of a positive and signiﬁcant result for the aid
variable. It seems that this result does not depend on good policy because when we
include policy the aid variable actually become insigniﬁcant (Table 3, columns 5). If
this is true, then conditional on policy aid is actually growth retarding which is in direct
contrast to what Burnside and Dollar (2000) claim. Furthermore, we also ﬁnd that the
aid-growth interaction term is insigniﬁcant.
The major problem with the model presented in Table 3, columns 5 is the negative
and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient of the education variable. We will expect that higher levels
of education will promote growth so this is a contradiction. We hesitate to invalidate
25our model however because the growth promoting process in SSA may not be too
dependent on the level of education. Most SSA communities are subsistence farmers
who do not have the means to use a good education to effectively add to output. What
we are trying to say is that the productive processes in SSA that actually augment
GDP may be only weakly dependent on education. It is true that by getting more
education and changing the technology of production process education will certainly
begrowthpromoting. Wehoweverconcedethatthismightbeaproblemwiththemodel
speciﬁcation. Furthermore since aid is such a big promoter of growth and most of the
aid might go primarily to promote commerce, and not to schooling education may not
contribute so much to growth through its effect on aid.
Analysis of the dynamic panel model proved a lot more challenging. The most
consistent result obtained by comparing the results of the different types of dynamic
models (Anderson and Hsiao (1981), Arrellano and Bond (1995), Arrellano and Bond
(1998) to a parsimonious dynamic panel model is rather surprising. From Table 4, it
is clear that the parsimony model that only has the lagged growth model explains the
biggest portion of the variation in growth. One explanation for this is that there is little
left over for other conditioning variables in the dynamic speciﬁcation of the growth
model to explain once the lagged growth is included in the equation.
8 Conclusions and Challenges for Future Research
By deﬁning a 4-equation simultaneous system to account for the possible simultaneity
bias that arises because aid, growth, and political stability are determined together we
26ﬁnd that aid is growth promoting in SSA after estimation by FE. We cannot not conﬁrm
Burnside and Dollar (2000)’s claim that this relationship is conditional on good policy.
We however substantiate Islam (2005)’s ﬁnding that political stability is necessary for
aid to effectively promote growth. We ﬁnd that the aid growth relation does not have
decreasing returns to scale because the aid square coefﬁcient is not signiﬁcant. Based
on this result, it seems that there is no end to how much aid the developed world should
pump into SSA to help achieve the goals of the millennium project. However caution
should be exercised before using the results of this study for policy. First of all, still
remain endogeneity problems that I side- stepped in my analysis. For example we did
not attack endogeneity due to measurement error. There may also remain endogeneity
due to omitted variable bias and feedback. Although these are important problems we
did not focus on them and further research into these problems is needed. Furthermore,
it is important to understand the real reasons why donors give aid and how recipient
countries strategize to receive aid. Clearly there are issues of asymmetric information
here, as donors cannot completely monitor how the aid they give is used. By contrast
recipients are often uncertain about aid packages they will receive in the future. It
will be interesting to investigate what proportion of a typical SSA country’s budget
each year comes from aid and how that has evolved over time? If we are to save
SSA countries from aid dependency then we should put in place incentives that will
augment the ability for aid to promote growth and eliminate incentives that encourage
aid dependency. It is gratifying to discover that aid does promote growth; the challenge
is how to optimize growth-promoting power of aid by channeling it to the right paces
27in SSA. 34
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32Table 1aCorrelation Matrix of Independent Variables 
IGDP LE GCR OIL AID OPEN SCH
IGDP 1.00
LE 0.14 1.00
GCR -0.05 1.13 1.00
OIL 0.17 -0.25 -0.22 1.00
AID 0.03 0.47 -0.04 -0.30 1.00
OPEN 0.17 -0.03 0.01 0.47 -0.08 1.00
SCH 0.05 0.47 0.07 0.09 0.25 0.103 1.00  
































The table reports the mean for the most important variables used in the analysis.  Standard deviations are 
reported in parentheses below the mean values. 
 
33Table 2: Country-Specific Effect- Endogeneity test results 
 
Table 1 Endogeneity  Test
VARIABLES Marginal Effect St Error P-value
IGDP -3.47 *e-5 1.98*e-5 0.08
LE 1.70*e-1 9.9*e-2 0.08
GCR -2.2*e-3 8.3*e-3 0.79
OIL -6.96*e1 4.20*e1 0.09
AID 9.58*e-2 2.09*e-2 0
OPEN -1.3*e-3 2.9*e-2 0.96
DEM 1.6*e-2 2.3*e-2 0.51
SCH 2.4*e-2 8.3*e-2 0.77
AVIGDP 3.54*e-5 1.98*e-5 0.07
AVGCR 3.6*e-3 1.3*e-2 0.79
AVLE -3.08*e-2 1.41*e-1 0.02
AVSCH 2.77 1.76 0.12
AVINF 2.5*e-3 2.81*e-3 0.38
AVAID -9.5*e-2 3*e-2 0
AVPOSGR 30.69 13.17 0.02
AVPOL 2.16e-10    10   8.05e-10      0.8
AVPS -6.7*e1 41.5 0.11
AVM2 -2.74e-18    1.07*e-17 0.8
CONS 9.95*e1 6.30*e1 0.12  
Test AVIGDP AVGCR AVLE AVSCH AVINF AVAID AVPOSGR AVPOL AVPS AVM2 
ChiSq (10) =  46.63 
Prob>ChiSq= 0 
GROWTH= growth rate of GDP per capita, AID =Aid per capita, PS = Political Stability or good 
governance, INF = Inflation, DEM = a dummy for democracy, OPEN is a measure of openness of the 
economy, DIAM= a dummy for if the county exports diamonds, OIL = a dummy for if the county exports 
OIL. 
 
Table 2 reports results from an endogeneity test reproduced in Wooldridge (2003).  The mechanics of the 
test involves including the individual means of the exogenous variables as additional exogenous variables 
and estimating by fixed effects. For example IGDP = Initial GDP and AVIGDP = mean of IGDP. The null 
hypothesis is that that the individual means are jointly not significantly different from zero.  Rejection of 
the null indicates a preference for FE over RE. 
 
 
34Table 3: Serial correlation test and static panel regression model results 
Table3 Auto-Corr-Test Aid-Eqn Aid-Policy Model of Choice No PS, POL
Dep Var--> GROWTH AID GROWTH GROWTH GROWTH
l.GROWTH 0.022
(0.093)
IGDP -3.0*e-5 -1.3*e-5 3.0*e-5 -2.76*e5 -4.36*e-5
(1.86*e-5) (1.4*e-5) (2.3*e-5) (2.6*e-5)
LE 4.3*e-1 2.2*e-2 7.2*e-2 1.3*e-1
(1.57*e-1) (6.8*e-2) (9.0*e-2) (1.0*e-1)
GCR 3.5*e-4 1.6*e-3 6.2*e-3 7.5*e-3
(9.8*e-3) (5.4*e-3) (3.3*e-2) (3.8*e-2)
OIL -23.06
(54.20)
AID 0.04 7.0*e-2 6.5*e-2
* 8.5*e-2
(0.03) (4.8*e-2) (2.5*e-2) (2.75*e-2)
OPEN -0.03 9.5*e-3 1.43*e-2 1.2*e-1
(0.02) (3.4*e-2) (5.3*e-2) (6.0*e-1)
INF 8.7*e-4 -2.4*e-3 -3.5*e-3
(6.3*e-4) (3.1*e-3) (3.6*e-3)
SCH -0.02 -9.6*e-1 -7.0*e-1* 1.3*e-1
(0.08) (1.2*e-1) (2.10*e-1) (1.28e-2)
DEM -5.7*e-3 5.3*e-3
(1.6*e-2) (3.1*e-2)







AIDPOL 3.24e-13   
(1.96e-11)
INV 7.6*e-2
CONS 29.01 88.36* -25.82 -32.43452    -4.347983   
R
2-Overall 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.5
F-Test (a,b) 4.52
RSS  
Table 3 displays the results of a test of autocorrelation (column 2) as well the output from 3 different regressions that help tease out 
the real effect of aid on growth (columns 4, 5 and 6).  Column 3 documents the instrumentation of the aid equation to minimize 
endogeneity before including the aid variable in the growth equation. The BP test in Table 2 is essentially an LM test of 





35Table 4:  Results of regression for political stability index as well as 1
st stage IV 
regression results for political stability and policy. 
Table4 PS EQN1 PS EQN2 Policy EQ













(3.39e-08 )       
POSGR 2.95*e-1*














Table 4 reports the regression that identifies the political stability index (column 2) as well as the first stage 
instrumental variable regressions for the 2 endogenous variables political stability (PS) and policy (POL) in 
columns 3 and 4 respectively. 
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Table 5: Comparing Dynamic Panel Estimates 
GROWTH A&H1981 Parsimony A&B (1995) System
Model One-Step 2-step GMM
GROWTH-2  -2.65 -2.7*e-1 -3.8*e-1*
(5.00) (1.02*e-1) (9.0*e-2)
d.AID 2.8*e-1 4.4*e-3 3.5*e-2
(7.1*e-1) (3.0*e-2)
d.PS 18.4 2.83 Dropped
(32.4)
d.POL -15.7 -2.07e-10 -5.90e-10 
(49.5) (9.98e-11)












CONSTANT 2.334619  






GROWTH= growth rate of GDP per capita, AID =Aid per capita, PS = Political Stability or good 
governance, INF = Inflation, DEM = a dummy for democracy, OPEN is a measure of openness of the 
economy, DIAM= a dummy for if the county exports diamonds, OIL = a dummy for if the county exports 
OIL. 
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